approaches, private sector, consumer interests and requirements, political will, and socioeconomic issues in addition to science and risk assessments. Considering and balancing these factors are country-specific. For instance, in countries with developed economies, governments have compliance-based enforcement systems with emphasis on preventing hazards from occurring, compared to deterrent-based strategies, based on tiered inspection regimes (Garcia Martinez, Fearne, Caswell, & Henson, 2007; Fulponi, 2006; Lee & Marsden, 2009; Loader & Hobbs, 1999; Rouvière & Caswell, 2012; Rouvière, Soubeyran, & Bignebat, 2010) .
Since the 1990s, food safety regulations have evolved worldwide and food producers have frequently been given more responsibility to monitor the safety of their products (Codron, Fares, & Rouvière, 2007; Henson & Caswell, 1999; Henson & Hooker, 2001; Loader & Hobbs, 1999; Segerson, 1999) . This led to the introduction of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system in several food industries worldwide. As a result of its success in countries with developed economies, HACCP is increasingly being implemented in countries with less developed economies that export food products into industrialized markets (Merican, 1996) . The growing use of HACCP as a food safety management system in international trade led the Codex Alimentarius to develop guidelines for HACCP in 1993 and incorporate it into food hygiene codes starting in 1995 (Whitehead & Orriss, 1995) . Despite the widespread acceptance of the application of HACCP among regulatory and international agencies, there are several controversies surrounding enforcement of the food safety system (Antle, 1998; Hathaway, 1995; Hathaway & Cook, 1997; Smith-De Waal, 1996) . Considering the scarcity of public sector resources, impact of the system on competitiveness, and the scale of the workload, there are growing interests in coregulation, with public and private sectors working together to deliver safe food at low regulatory cost (Garcia Martinez, Fearne, Caswell, & Henson, 2007) . There should be a combination of responsibility from all levels of stakeholders in the food retail sector in order to improve food safety and prevent food safety breaches (Boatemaa et al., 2019) . Increasing number of countries uses new coregulation schemes focusing on a specific type of coregulation where regulations are developed by public authorities and then implemented by the coordinated actions of public authorities and food operators or "enforced self-regulation" (Guo, Bai, & Gong, 2019; Rouvière & Caswell, 2012) .
From a theoretical perspective, the existence of market failures is the central rationale for regulatory intervention in the provision of food safety. The market failure is attributed to the existence of asymmetric information about food safety attributes between producers and consumers or imperfect, symmetric information for both consumers and producers (Antle, 1996) .
The level of public intervention may range from being inactive, thereby leaving the market to find the requisite solution to direct regulation (Better Regulation Task Force, 2003) . In-between, there is a wide range of options including industry self-regulation, government provision of information, education campaigns, and labeling requirements (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007) . The consequent problem is the relationships between regulators and the regulated and the scope for regulatory capture which is the pursuit of the regulated business' interests rather than those of the public at large (Fearne et al., 2004) . Coregulation aims to combine the advantages of the predictability and binding nature of legislation with the flexibility of self-regulatory approaches. It would therefore serve as a possible model for food safety governance, mixing self-regulation and legislative action working together in a manner that mutually reinforces one another (Dordeck-Jung, Oude Vrielink, Gosselt, Hoof, & Jong, 2010; Eijlander, 2005; Garcia Martinez et al., 2007; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998) .
Food safety regulation receives particular attention in China due to complex, highly publicized food safety incidents (Lu & Wu, 2014) .
In this paper, we focus on the situation in China where the food control system is undergoing a shift from supervision to social coregulation. The food control system in China was not well organized before 2009. In 2008, about 294,000 infants were diagnosed with urinary calculus, and more than 50,000 were hospitalized, while six infants died (MOH, 2008) . The first Food Safety Law was released by the Chinese government in February 2009 and implemented in June of the same year. The Food Safety Law has been delayed for a long time, due to the development of various versions of the law by several major regulatory departments, resulting in lack of consensus. The concept of "Healthy China" was proposed at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017. In the proposal, China is expected to improve the national health policy and the system for medicine supply, thereby promoting healthy and positive lifestyles, and initiating a food safety strategy to ensure that people have confidence in the food they eat (Xi, 2017) .
The proposed classical regulatory system consists of three levels: rules, supervision, and execution. Laws and regulations related to food safety in China are often drafted by specific law enforcement departments, such as Food Hygiene Law, Product Quality Act, Consumer Protection Act, and Agricultural Product Quality Act.
The supervision of food safety is mainly dependent on law enforcement departments. Therefore, food safety regulatory authorities can reflect the basic vision of China's food safety regulation. As the highest regulatory authority in China, The Food Safety Committee of the State Council suggested that the food safety management must be further strengthened with strict standards, strict supervision, strict punishment, and strict accountability system to ensure the "tongue-in-tongue safety" of the people (SC, 2019) . Shenzhen won 10% of the total votes of 67 pilot cities in China, ranking first, during the "Thumbs up for Your City" campaign of the Food Safety Committee. The successful experiences of Shenzhen showed that once the coregulation system was formed, it needs to be supported immediately by the regulatory authorities with finance, propaganda, and legitimacy. This paper is presented in five parts: The next section discusses the history of food safety governance in China, and the subsequent sections focus on challenges and weaknesses of the current food control and regulatory system up to date, and strengths and opportunities of coregulation practice in the city of Shenzhen.
The paper concludes with some thoughts on the role of coregulation in food safety and the need for further research.
| HIS TORY OF FOOD SAFE T Y G OVERNAN CE IN CHINA
At the beginning of China's economic reform, more than 82% of the country's population lived in rural areas and people consumed mostly raw, homemade, and less processed foods. In the last three decades, as industrialization and urbanization accelerates, the proportion of the rural population has reduced to about 40% (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2018) . Due to the successful cultivation of hybrid wheat and hybrid rice varieties and the application of fertilizer, China has been self-sufficient of grain since the 1990s. Modernization of China's food industry has resulted in increasing animal food production and growing capacity of food processing. Chinese consume much more processed and packaged foods, and often away from home (Liu, Wahl, Seale, & Bai, 2015; Waldron, Brown, & Longworth, 2010; Zhai et al., 2014; Zhang, Wu, Yao, Bai, & Xiong, 2014; Zhou, Zhang, & Xu, 2012) .
In order to maintain efficient agricultural production, the Chinese government has invested in the production technology of rice, wheat, corn, cotton, soybean, pig, cattle, and sheep, including transgenic technology research. In recent years, serious environmental pollution has brought crisis to agricultural water (Lu et al., 2015) . In addition, a large number of pesticides are used in China's cultivated land. China has been a country with the largest amount of pesticide production in the world. The rapid transformation of China's food industry with massive food processing could increase the possibility for opportunistic behavior in food malpractices, resulting in the emergence of food fraud or economically motivated adulteration in the country (Hong & Wu, 2017; Zhang & Xue, 2016) .
In this section, the development of the Chinese food safety regulation was divided into five stages (Table 1) , comprising the centralized management , multisector management (1979-1995), matrix management (1995-2009), process management (2009-2015) , and integrated management (2015 to date).
While the Chinese government has developed more stringent regulatory measures and established the State Administration for Market Regulation, the intermediary management of the current regulatory system may be the Achilles' heel, as shown in section 3. Due to asymmetric information, lack of regulatory resources, and consumer advocacy, coregulation has been developed and is increasingly being promoted as an important instrument of regulation, as discussed in section 4.
| Period One: 1949-1979
In the 1950s, like most regions of the world, the main food concern of the Chinese government was on food supply. The concern for food safety mainly came from diseases and foodborne illnesses caused by health problems (Jen & Chen, 2017 from health and epidemic prevention agencies, including law enforcement, scientific research, and technology services, to independent institutions of health supervision.
| Period Two: 1979-1995
In 1979, multisector management situation emerged. The State
Council issued the regulations on food hygiene management, and the emphasis of food hygiene management transferred from prevention of intestinal infectious diseases to prevention of foodborne diseases. The 7th article pointed out that all departments of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, aquaculture, grain, supply and marketing, business, light industry, and trade should strengthen the purchase and inspection work on grain, oil, meat, eggs, aquatic products, vegetables, fruits, tea, and other food ingredients, and need to strictly prevent industrial waste, radioactive substances, pesticide pollution, and the spread of animal diseases (RMFH, 1979) .
In 1982, the People's Republic of China Food Hygiene Law (Trial Implementation) was promulgated and implemented, and food hygiene supervision system was clearly defined. It also stipulated that the food production and operation enterprises are responsible for the food hygiene work (FHL, 1982) . The administrative department of industry and commerce administered urban and rural affairs of food hygiene management and food hygiene inspection work. The department of agriculture and animal husbandry and fishery assumed the management of veterinary hygiene inspection of livestock and poultry. The health and epidemic prevention station or the institute of food hygiene supervision and inspection of the health administrative department was responsible for food hygiene supervision within the jurisdiction. The imported food products were inspected by the state food hygiene supervision and inspection agency. The exported food was supervised and inspected by the national import and export commodity inspection departments.
| Period Three: 1995-2009
In October 1995, the Food Hygiene Law of the People's Republic the National Standardization Committee. The principle of division supervision was intended to improve the food safety regulatory functions and to clarify the responsibilities: The agriculture departments assumed responsibility for supervision of the production of primary agricultural products; quality inspection departments were responsible for food production and processing; the quality inspection departments were responsible for food production, which were previously under the health department; departments of industry and commerce were responsible for the supervision of the consumption sections, such as restaurants and canteens; and departments of state food and drug regulatory authorities were responsible for the comprehensive supervision of food safety, organization, coordination, investigation, and punishment for serious accidents. According to the principle of consistency of rights and responsibilities, food safety regulatory responsibility and accountability system was established. In addition, to strengthen the management and comprehensive utilization of food information, the interdepartmental information communication platform was used to achieve interoperability and resource sharing. In July 
| Period Four: 2009-2015
In June 2009, the Food Safety Law was implemented with empha- In 2011, China Central Television (CCTV) reported that pig farms in Mengzhou, Henan Province, used the prohibited animal drug clenbuterol to breed pigs which were sold to Shuanghui Food Co., Ltd., the largest in China and the world's leading supplier of meat (Shao & Cai, 2016) . While the clenbuterol incident of Shuanghui Company occurred, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) was responsible for process management of food production (Jen & Chen, 2017) . At the same time, China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) assumed several responsibilities of policy and planning formulation, comprehensive coordination, major accident handling, and major information release. CFDA was established for the production, transportation, storage, distribution, and food supervision. SAIC was no longer responsible for the regulation of circulation, and AQSIQ was only responsible for the supervision of food-related products and the supervision of import and export of food.
| Period Five: 2015 to date
In 2015, the revised Chinese Food Safety Law promoted social cogovernance and industry self-discipline, and strengthened the role of social groups including the food industry association, consumer This platform was established by GS1 China, an affiliate of AQSIQ.
The application was established as a demonstration project on food safety quality traceability.
While the Chinese government has developed more stringent regulatory measures and established the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in April 2018, the intermediary of current regulatory system may be the Achilles' heel. Local government is responsible for providing unified leadership, organization, and coordination of food safety supervision and management of the administrative regions, as well as food safety emergency responses, supervision and management mechanism, and information sharing mechanism.
| CURRENT CHALLENG E S AND WE AKNE SSE S
Food safety is a complex system, involving raw materials, production environment, food production, processing, transportation, storage technology, and equipment. and fruit and fruit products (1,372, 7.37%) (Hong & Wu, 2017) .
Based on total proportion, food safety events are concentrated in food production and processing (66.91%), followed by consumption (21.18%), circulation (6.42%), and production of primary agricultural products (5.49%). Food safety incidents caused by human factors accounted for 66.18% of the total, including illegal use of food additives (30.71%), fake and shoddy products (19.81%), and materials and products that are sold outside the general requirements for food labeling (7.6%). It was notable that the overuse of food additives was the primary factor. The main reasons were excessive use of preservatives in order to extend the shelf life of the product, illegal use of sweeteners to improve the taste of products, illegal use of colorants to modify product appearance, illegal use of sulfite bleaching treatment in the production process, and illegal use of stabilizers in order to prevent or delay normal food fading, oxidation, rancidity, turbidity, and flavor changes (Liu et al., 2018) . Natural factors include pathogenic microorganisms (18.85%), pesticides and veterinary drug residues (9.29%), heavy metals (4.33%), and impurity substance (1.35%). Food safety systems comprise of individual parts that include science-based research, culture, international trade agreement, food laws, and industry standards. These sectors operate together as a mechanism to integrate food safety frameworks.
Any constraint to this system such as resources, technical skills, government support, and food laws may hinder the efficient functioning of food safety. Therefore, food safety regulation may be considered from three dimensions: stakeholders, technology, and management.
| Food safety stakeholders
At present, the Engel coefficient, which measures the proportion of income spent on food, in developed countries is generally below 15%, and the corresponding food safety scores are more than 80 points. Thus, there is a phased relationship between food safety and the level of economic development. China's Engel coefficient has improved from 57.5% (urban) and 67.7% (rural) in 1978 to 36.3% (urban) and 40.4% (rural) in 2011 (Ma, 2012) . The current Engel coefficient of Chinese residents was 39.4% (NDRC, 2018) , which means China is still in the risk-prone period of food safety. In addition to fulfilling basic survival needs, food is widely perceived as an ordinary commercial commodity for making profit, and thus, several incidents of illegal activities have occurred, in pursuit of increased margins, by food producers and manufacturers that have jeopardized the public's trust in food safety (Lam, Remais, Fung, Xu, & Sun, 2013) .
Water scarcity, overapplication of pesticide, and chemical pollutants are considered to be the most important environmental factors impacting on food safety in China (Lu et al., 2015; Zhang, Zhong, Liu, & Ouyang, 2015) . There are more than 200 million farmers engaged in cultivation who use about half a million tons of pesticides, 60 million tons of fertilizers, and 2.5 million tons of agricultural plastic films every year. Extensive agricultural production in China leads to chemical pollution (Lu et al., 2015) , which is the biggest risk of current food safety. At the same time, about 20% of cultivated land in China exceeds the pollution standard of heavy metal or organic substances, and about 60% of groundwater monitoring points show poor to extremely poor (Hu, 2016) .
Food industry, accounting for >10% of the total industrial output value of China, has become the largest industry and important pillar of the national economy. However, compared to the food supply system with centralized production and orderly circulation in developed countries, the food industrial structure in China is still multiple, fragmented with about 10% enterprises certificated for HACCP (Hu, 2016) . Another major factor in Chinese food safety system is food Food adulteration or fraud, such as the illegal addition of none approved food substances and forbidden drugs to food products, has long been a key regulatory content by Chinese government. (Hu, 2016) .
Several food scandals including adulteration, microbial contamination, excessive pesticide residues, and additives have continually raised consumers' anxieties about food safety. Scattered farmers and small firms constitute the main body of food production. Due to the urgent need to improve their living standards or their earnings, there are different levels of nonstandard production and operation of food products. Moreover, due to the lack of integrity and morality, the economic penalties, and legal sanctions, under the increasingly severe pollution conditions, it is inevitable to experience frequent occurrence of food safety incidents. Another prominent incident involving the presence of cadmium in rice in 2013 was reported by the Guangzhou Food and Drug Administration. The incident on cadmium rice induced extreme panic among southern residents (Zong, 2013) .
| Food safety technical regulations
Since (Wu & Chen, 2018) . The identification of food safety as a national priority has driven modernization of the food safety legislative framework along with organizational change, leading up to the creation of China's National Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (CFSA), as a key contributor to the food safety standard setting process (Zhang, Godefroy, Lyu, Sun, & Fun, 2018) . Meanwhile, efforts of government and food industry are not recognized by consumers, and the credibility of the government is decreasing due to poor communication of food safety risk with the public.
Traceability provides a trace-back system which may provide consumers with assurances throughout the supply chains. The system aims to reduce the risks of foodborne diseases. However, a compulsory national animal product traceability system has not yet been established in China due to the limitations of resources, such as sponsors, availability of technology, and data standardization (Bai et al., 2017) . For instance, to build the food traceability system may be not costly, but it requires budget for consumables and efficient management of the workforce. Although the existing system implemented in Beijing can provide consumers with traceability information, most consumers do not have confidence in the enquiry system as they are unable to make informed decisions about the safety of the food (Wang, Yue, & Zhou, 2017) . Thus, the system should not only realize effective traceability, but also provide information about the evaluation of quality in the production chain. This approach may provide information to strengthen the food safety management system including traceability.
| Food safety supervision system

| Food safety regulatory agencies
According to the Food Safety Law of China, Food Safety Committee ical assessment, local governments are both food safety regulatory agencies and regional competitive entities, so the collusion between local governments, or different counties, and enterprises becomes a rational choice (Tirole, 1986) . The multiple principal-agent relationship of food safety supervision in China can be simplified as shown in Figure 2. 
| Food safety policy
Post-inspection increasingly reflects its limitations due to delayed reaction, expensive cost, and difficulties for effectively identifying the industry chain responsibility (Unnevehr & Jensen, 1999) . HACCP is a food safety management system which focuses on prevention of potential hazards in food. The food safety system does not only prevent food safety hazards (Pierson and Corlett, 1992) , but also reduces postprocessing inspections and waste thereby increasing output. HACCP has been widely adopted by many companies in countries with developed economies (Merican, 1996) .
In China, the concept of HACCP was introduced in 1990, when the State Import and Export Commodity Inspection Bureau organized the Research and Application Plan of Export Food Safety
Engineering. At its inception in China, HACCP was adopted by 250 food enterprises including aquatic products and other ten categories (CNCA, 2015) . In 2002, AQSIQ issued regulations on hygiene registration for export food manufacturers for the first time. HACCP was compulsorily required for high-risk products such as canned food, aquatic products, meat, fruits and vegetables, and quick frozen convenience foods. In 2003, the Ministry of Health issued the Action Plan for Food Safety, which required food production enterprises to intensively promote the implementation of the HACCP system. With the development of Food Safety Law in 2009, food production enterprises were encouraged to establish the HACCP system and strengthen ex ante control of food safety. The major problem was on the implementation and monitoring of the food safety system, since both melamine contamination formula and clenbuterol meat were produced by HACCP-certified enterprises.
The melamine-contaminated milk incident in China was one of the most serious events considering that young children are relatively vulnerable to food contaminants. The Chinese Ministry of Health reported that 294,000 children were diagnosed with melamine-related urinary stones, of whom 51,900 were hospitalized and at least six children died (MOH, 2008) . Melamine is a nitrogen-rich organic compound and an intermediate chemical frequently used for the manufacture of fertilizers, plastics, laminates, paints, and adhesives, and was illegally added to foods to increase their protein contents, resulting in the melamine-contaminated milk powder scandal in
China. The chemical compound harmed the health of many infants and young children which led to global attention of the fatal incident (Lancet, 2009; Li, Song, & Wen, 2019; Pei et al., 2011) . Clenbuterol was used as a feed additive to promote leanness in livestock raised for their meat, and it can cause harmful effects in humans, such as inducing malignancies, chromosomal aberrations, metabolic disorders, hypokalemia, and other acute types of poisoning (Shao & Cai, 2016) . In response to the continuous public demands for strengthening food safety governance, China adopted effective rules, norms, approaches, and good practices to food safety governance, including social governance. The initiatives lead the development of the 2015
Food Safety Law provisions to promote corporate social responsibility, as well as create a sustainable and effective food safety culture and behavioral change (Roberts & Lin, 2016) . Besides, a report on the development of food safety regulatory systems in EU and China recommended additional measures such as training and grants to improve the capacity of the private sector to regulate China's food safety systems (Chen, Wang, & Song, 2015) .
| COREG UL ATI ON IN S HENZHEN
On the current situation in China, due to asymmetric information, there is a wide range of food fraud behaviors (Gong, Zhang, & Yu, 2013; Ortega, L., Wang H. H., Wu L., Olynk, & J. N., 2011; Li & Chen, 2013; Li & Shi, 2014) . Meanwhile, there are regulatory captures caused by the competitive burden between local governments (Gong, Lei, & Yuan, 2015) and food producer behavioral dilemmas under severe supervision (Xie, Lai, Xiao, & Wu, 2016) .
Public concern about food safety is placing increasing pressure on government agencies to be more prescriptive and proactive in their regulation of the food industry. However, due to scarcity of public sector resources, concerns about the impact of regulation on
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The multiple principal-agent relationship of food safety supervision in China competitiveness, and the current scale of the task, there is a possible model of coregulation, with public and private sectors working together to deliver safer food at lower cost (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007; Rouvière & Caswell, 2012) . In 2014, the office of Food showed that once the coregulation system was formed, it needs to be supported at the onset by the regulatory authorities with finance, propaganda, and legitimacy.
| Food safety coregulatory agencies
In order to use auditing as an inspection method rather than placing excessive emphasis on end-product testing, the government of Shenzhen integrated resources of different food safety stakeholders to improve the overall food safety governance system. Shenzhen Instead, the jury members are representatives of their companies for mutual learning and mutual supervision. By cycle rating system, representatives are both supervisors and the supervised. This review method not only drastically reduces the supervisory cost, but also forms a benign atmosphere for the industry to learn from each other.
Institute of Standards and
Finally, different from daily supervision, only qualified enterprises are publicized, while unqualified companies would obtain suggestions for rectification. In this way, the association and member enterprises successfully develop self-organizing mode of food safety, which not only reduces the regulatory burden of government, but also increases the level of food safety management.
| Food safety coregulatory process
The realities of food safety responsibilities have brought about a new paradigm in stakeholder relationships characterized by complex interactions between public and private modes of regulation (Fearne et al., 2004) . Hence, coregulation needs to appreciate the motivations for private actors to implement enhanced food safety controls (Henson & Hooker, 2001; Hobbs et al., 2002) . There are distinct differences in the established regulatory process in different countries (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007) . Food safety regulation belongs to public service actively involving the government of China.
Therefore, government support has an important influence on the development and operation of coregulation systems. The coregulation practice in Shenzhen has experienced three periods. First, the task of creating demonstration city exerted pressure on the transformation of food safety governance. Second, with the promotion of governance awareness and strategic transformation, all the stakeholders of food safety began to realize their duties toward a cohesive vision. Lastly, the Shenzhen Retail Business Association, supported by the government, assumed a core role of the coregulation system (Xie et al., 2017) .
| Unfreezing of supervision system
The transformation of food safety governance does not only to deal with consumers' growing demand, but also alleviates the challenges encountered by regulators in daily supervision. One of the challenges is the real plight of extreme lack of regulatory resources. Although human resources, material, and financial resources invested by the regulatory authorities have increased significantly, with the acceleration of industrialization and variety of food products, they are still inadequate to meet the daily regulatory requirements. Further, the supervision department is confronted with lack of professional supervision, while the enterprises have more information about food manufacturing, circulation, catering, and other activities. Since the supervision departments became the only subject of accountability, when food safety incidents occurred, the grassroots of supervision system had to be more alert. Finally, the government of Shenzhen was committed to promoting the governance strategy from single supervision to social coregulation.
| Changing of supervision system
After changing the regulatory philosophy, the first step is to actively
seek social governance subject, then the supervision can transfer part of its duties to enterprises and social organizations. Perhaps, the greatest scope for coregulation of food safety involves enforcement and monitoring rather than the establishment of regulatory standards (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007) . 
| Refreezing of coregulation system
Since the initial stages of social coregulation system, associations and enterprises have reduced the scope for innovation in food safety governance. They rely on the government's initiative to provide policy support to assist self-organization to acquire legitimacy. At the F I G U R E 3 Projection of coregulation same time, trust mechanism is the key element of self-organization, while government intervention objectively becomes the credit basis for attracting enterprises that are willing to participate, thereby reducing the startup cost of development. The supervision departments help the self-organization to learn the laws and regulations of food safety, to form a benign interaction with the consumers, and construct a good institutional environment. Once the coregulation system is formed, it is supported by the regulatory authorities with finance, propaganda, and legitimacy.
Food safety governance in China is more than a law and policy task, as it inherently holds significant economic, political, cultural, and social implications. After a series of reforms in the past decades,
China strives politically to develop and reinforce various regulatory tools, while there are areas beyond law and regulation that need to be further addressed, such as social governance, consumer trust, and behavioral change (Roberts & Lin, 2016) . The experiences of Shenzhen may provide a sample, learned from other Chinese cities by shifting from a top-down mandatory regulation to a bottom-up coregulation, as shown in Figure 3 .
| CON CLUS ION
Most of the food safety issues reported in China are caused by poor and ineffective food management systems. Most of the food safety accidents in China have been caused by human factors, accounted for 66.18% of the total (Hong & Wu, 2017) . The review has highlighted gross abuses of food additives which have resulted in tragic losses of life. The food safety system in China is characterized by five stages comprising centralized management, multisector management, matrix management, process management, and integrated management. While the Chinese government has developed more stringent regulatory measures and established the State Administration for Market Regulation, the intermediary of current regulatory system may be still the Achilles' heel. Due to asymmetric information, lack of regulatory resources, and consumer advocacy, coregulation has been developed and is increasingly being promoted as an important instrument of regulation. The paper presents a conceptual framework of enforcement of food safety regulation for use in shifting toward coregulation from traditional approaches, based on the case study of Shenzhen. In general, the food safety governance is undergoing a shift from emphasis on punishment to advocating prevention, and supervision to promotion of cogovernance. The reform practice of food safety in Shenzhen shows that social coregulation is a feasible approach, given the coordination of government activities and other organizations including consumers.
Intermediaries, such as consumer council and the third-party quality inspection agencies, may take more important role in the future.
The concept of coregulation was developed over the last two decades and is applied to a range of economic activities. Food safety coregulation may arise, while creating new legislation or regulatory rules, by incorporating the opinions of companies, consumers, voters, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders in one framework, but varying degrees of stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process and in different countries. Under the current Chinese governance scenario, especially after the national food safety strategy, government intervention has strengthened and has created opportunities to form the coregulatory system with different roles.
